Inflection point or continuing spiral in the Middle East?

After almost two years of fighting in Gaza, and after the decimation of Hizballah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and the 12-day Israeli-American war on Iran, the Middle East is in new strategic and political territory. Two pathways lie ahead: the first is one in which the gains and changes brought about by war are turned, through intense diplomacy and negotiation, into new international and political arrangements that bring about a period of security and stability in the region; the second is one in which that corner is not turned, and the wars in Gaza, Iran, and potentially Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, continue indefinitely. The trajectory will depend on the choices of key actors — above all Iran, Israel, and the United States.

Iran: Shaken but not turned

Strategic setback and internal dilemmas

The leadership in Tehran has a big say in the matter. Having suffered a significant downgrading of Iran’s Axis of Resistance and lost most of the country’s ability to deter — or defend against — direct Israeli or American military attacks, the Iranian government has much to consider. Tehran knows that President Donald Trump is interested in a deal, but what the regime leaders hear is a triumphalist US demanding zero enrichment as a base line; they might also expect that Trump will put curtailing their missile program and their support of proxy militias back on the table as he did in his March letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

So far, while the Iranians have signaled a willingness to talk, they have also communicated a defiance and lack of willingness to offer the major concessions that would now be required for a deal. The regime in Iran would be worried, first of all, that giving up what is left of its nuclear program will leave it more vulnerable to the next Israeli and American attack. But additionally, it fears that signaling near-surrender to the “two Satans” — against which the Islamic Republic has spent the last 45 years drumming up hostility — might leave the regime more vulnerable at home.

The prospect, and limits, of a deal

What might be possible is a deal close to what Iran was offering before the 12-day war: much-reduced enrichment, new and longer timelines, and tight international monitoring, in exchange for lifting sanctions; i.e., a spruced-up version of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement. The Trump team called the talks useful but had not agreed to walking away from zero enrichment. Of course, it would be up to the unpredictable Trump to decide if he could accept such a "limited" deal. First of all, a “yes” would allow him to tell his base he has made peace as he had promised (adding greater legitimacy to his coveted Nobel Peace Prize bid) and taken war with Iran off the table. Second, it would enhance the US’s ability to manage the Iran nuclear risk, at least for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, a JCPOA 2.0 would fall far short of the maximalist demands he has been airing. His command of the Republican Party suggests that any hardline dissent from his domestic allies could be controlled.

Israeli objections and Netanyahu’s strategic logic

The larger challenge would come from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He would be strongly opposed to such a deal. From his perspective on the developments of the last two years, Israel and the US have a great strategic military advantage over Iran. Rather than settle now, they should press that advantage either until Iran offers maximalist concessions (which would include zero enrichment, limits on its ballistic missile and maybe its drone programs, and an end to support for its regional proxy militias) or push on to degrade the regime and work toward its eventual downfall and/or replacement. Trump entertained this “Iran surrender” scenario in some social media posts during the 12-day war, but he then made different statements saying that regime change is not on his agenda. Netanyahu could be legitimately worried that Trump might be more interested in an imperfect deal that he can dress up as the “Deal of the Century” and then move on to other things.

The talks that were and the war that followed

The US and Iran were making progress toward a potential deal during their two months of talks before the war erupted in June. Iran had indicated its willingness to go back to low levels of enrichment and accept an even tighter nuclear monitoring regime. But Trump’s team was still demanding zero enrichment. Fatefully, the Iranians did not take seriously Trump’s impatience or his 60-day game clock.

It is not clear if Trump and Netanyahu had agreed on an Iran strike as early as their February summit, but Trump was still urging Iran to make a deal. In any case, Israel’s prime minister finally launched that attack one day after the 60-day negotiation deadline had expired. With Israel able to dominate Iran’s skies at will, Netanyahu has now made himself a principal player in any follow-on US-Iran talks.

The direct Israeli and American bombing campaign certainly rendered Iran much more vulnerable and hence, in theory, in need of a deal; but the attacks have also raised the nationalist hackles of the regime in Tehran. While a deal might be more necessary for Iran today, it is also now more politically difficult, as any concession would be seen as being made from a position of weakness.

Netanyahu can continue to use Israel’s military capacities to complicate or derail any talks. In addition, he will use Israel’s political sway in Washington to try to keep pressure on Trump to dissuade him from imposing anything but a maximalist deal.

All of this is to say that a US-Iran agreement appears unlikely at this point. Trump, seeing this writing on the wall, has already floated that, after the strikes on Iran, he does not need a deal. This means that the Israel-Iran confrontation will continue to simmer with a risk of escalation at any moment. For the time being, Netanyahu appears to be giving Trump a chance to deal with the political fallout with his base from having entangled the US in another war in the Middle East; and Israel is also busy assessing the effects of the strikes on Iran’s nuclear and other programs before planning its next moves.

Between lull and escalation

Without a deal, Iran could hope for an extended lull scenario, or some kind of de facto cease-fire, in which it does not make any significant moves to rebuild its nuclear program or go for a bomb and keeps its proxies away from major attacks on Israel or the US. In this scenario, Iran, having absorbed the slew of recent blows, would simply avoid any further losses and buy time to recover and figure out a way forward. While Trump might be OK with this and could move on to the many other items on his crowded and frenetic agenda, Netanyahu would not be. The latter is aware that Israel (and the US) have a decisive (and perhaps temporary) military advantage and that Iran is very much on the back foot. While Trump was eager to tie a “12-day” bow on the war that Israel started, Netanyahu sees last month’s war as only the opening, and very successful, first round of pressing a historic military advantage that had been enabled by the earlier decimation of Hizballah and the fall of the Assad regime. While Netanyahu might be patient for a few more weeks or months, his strategic logic suggests a return to direct military action against Iran in the not-too-distant future.

The weakened but persistent regional axis

When it comes to Iran’s regional influence, its Axis of Resistance is down but not out. The Tehran-led proxy network’s main function — which used to be played almost exclusively by Lebanese Hizballah — of deterring Israel or the US from direct attacks on Iran has collapsed and probably cannot be rebuilt. But the ability to harass both Israel and the US, and potentially other US friends and allies, remains. Even in its devastated condition, axis member Hamas has kept Israel at war for almost two years and is likely to engage it in a third. The Houthis in Yemen, meanwhile, have been able to harm Israeli and US interests by significantly reducing sea traffic through the critical Red Sea waterway; and they appear able to keep it up indefinitely, despite multiple American and Israeli military attempts to shut them down.

Hizballah: Down but not out

In Lebanon, Hizballah has been dealt a staggering blow. They have had to agree to withdraw their main forces from the region south of the Litani River but are so far refusing to give up their arms in other parts of the country; and they remain the dominant political party in the region south of the Litani and among their Shi’ite community. Shorn of much of its leadership, many fighters, and a significant portion of its stockpiled heavy weaponry, the group is currently in no position to pose a serious threat to Israel; but Iran takes the long view and might, if Hizballah can hold on and survive this deep crisis, find a way to rebuild the Lebanese militia in the decade or two ahead.

Strategic reversal in Syria — the long game

A key variable is Syria, where Iran suffered its starkest loss. If President Ahmad al-Sharaa can consolidate his breakthrough in Damascus and manage to reunify all of Syria under his leadership, then Iran’s setback would be permanent and Hizballah’s chances of reviving in Lebanon at all would be effectively extinguished. But the “transition” in Syria is anything but assured. Despite a strong embrace from the Gulf, Turkey, Europe, and the US, its internal situation remains deeply troubled and divided. Sectarian and ethnic tensions are at the boiling point with clashes erupting most recently in the Druze-held south, after massacres in the Alawi west, and following an explosion in an Orthodox church in Damacus; talks between Damascus and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), under American auspices, have not made measurable progress. Tehran is betting and working against Syria’s success, and it figures correctly that if the transition falls apart, Iran could reconnect to the Syrian coastline and, from there, to Hizballah in Lebanon through the Bekaa Valley.

The Iraqi cornerstone

In Iraq, the pro-Iranian militias within the Hashd (also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF) continue to cast a long political and security shadow. Iran’s influence in Iraq through them has not diminished as a result of the events of the 12-day war or the past two years. Indeed, as Iran lost Syria and has less influence in Lebanon than it had before, it is doubling down in Iraq. In addition, the rise of Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria revives the specter of a radical Sunni resurgence and recreates the worries that gave rise to the Hashd in the first place.

Decline and possible de-escalation, but not capitulation

Though Iran’s Axis of Resistance has gone down a few notches in terms of its strategic prominence and purpose, it is still likely viewed as useful to Iran and worth some — even if relatively more modest — level of continued investment.

Indeed, under current conditions, the leadership in Tehran may prefer a de-escalation of the current high intensity of conflict, with only minor adjustments to its overall policy, to any major about-face.

Israel: Military gains but political paralysis

Israel, of course, is the even bigger player in this regional dynamic. Indeed, the military actions taken by Netanyahu and his cabinet after the attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, are what have reshaped realities in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. But there too it is unclear if Netanyahu is willing or able to turn his military advantages into political wins, or whether he has locked Israel into open-ended conflict. Winning the peace is often as hard or harder than winning the war, as the US found out after its early military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq; but making that transition from winning the war to forging and winning the peace requires deep and deliberate commitment, and Netanyahu has not shown a strong interest in that direction.

Gaza: War to no viable end

In Gaza, the early goal of destroying Hamas was an understandable one, but two years into the conflict the maximalist definition of that goal has meant that as long as there is one Hamas fighter standing (or hiding), Israel’s objectives have not been met and the war must go on. This not only grants Hamas a very easy measure of claiming a “resistance victory” but has also locked Netanyahu into a seemingly perpetual war in Gaza. By any traditional military measure, Hamas was soundly defeated a long time ago. But Netanyahu is unable to “take the win” or leverage it to “win the peace” with some form of postwar arrangements for the enclave. And the main reason for this appears to be that any end to the war with Hamas even nominally surviving will trigger the exit of his right-wing extremist partners, the fall of his government, and the potential end of his political career; this would also include accountability for the failures of Oct. 7, and possible legal jeopardy.

There have been on-again off-again talks to secure at least a temporary cease-fire and exchange of hostages/captives, but the war in Gaza risks going on for a third year, to the tremendous devastation, death, and suffering of the Palestinian people and the continued anguish of the remaining Israeli hostages and their families.

The continuation of that war would also mean that the major peace dividend that the region could witness — a breakthrough US-Saudi-Israeli agreement that includes Saudi-Israeli normalization — must also be put off indefinitely. For an issue that is so essential to Israel’s long-term security and prosperity — relations with Saudi Arabia and the other agreements that would follow — Netanyahu seems unable to turn Israel’s multiple military victories into the key historic political breakthrough that is tantalizingly close.

Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of ending the war in Gaza and doing so on terms that wind down the spiral of hate and violence as well as provide conditions to build peaceful and secure arrangements not only between Israelis and Palestinians but in the wider region as well.

While the newly emerging Middle East appears to be largely of Netanyahu’s making, to a large degree it is the late Hamas Political Bureau Chair Yahya Sinwar's new Middle East as well. The dynamics of peace and integration that prevailed before Oct. 7 are in abeyance, while multiple peace deals have been overshadowed by multiple wars. Walls of hate and hostility have not only been impactfully rebuilt between Israelis and Palestinians, but the events of the past two years have also turned a new generation in the Arab world into ardent supporters of the Palestinian cause and markedly hostile to Israeli actions. Gaza is where this latest crisis started, and Gaza is where regional de-escalation and peacebuilding needs to begin.

Ambivalence in the Levant

Lebanon: A hard-won agreement and rebuilding the state

Israeli ambivalence is also visible in Lebanon, where Israel dealt a major blow to its Hizballah foe. That blow, as well as the change of regime in Syria, allowed new nationalist leadership to emerge in Lebanon committed to rebuilding sovereignty and better governance. Lebanon and Israel reached a cessation of hostilities agreement last November, under US mediation. The first phase of the agreement calls for Hizballah to hand over military control of the area south of the Litani River to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from that area. The LAF and UNIFIL takeover of that region is proceeding apace, with some work still to be done, and Hizballah has largely abided by the terms of the first phase as well as a cessation of hostilities against Israel. Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon but has maintained an occupation of five points in contravention of the agreement and is continuing near-daily attacks across the border.

While Israel presents security reasons for these violations, the challenge is that Israeli actions directly undermine the rising Lebanese state’s case to its people, and to Hizballah’s followers, that the Lebanese state can assure their long-term security through diplomacy and the LAF presence. Israel’s contravention of the US-brokered agreement feeds Hizballah’s narrative that the Lebanese state cannot ensure the security and safety of the south — or indeed any part of Lebanon — and that, hence, Hizballah must keep its arms, at least north of the Litani.

It is not clear that Netanyahu’s goal in Lebanon is — like America’s — to leverage the change that his actions brought about to encourage the rise of a functioning sovereign and unified state that can dismantle remaining armed militias, maintain a calm and secure border, and eventually explore peaceful relations. It is conceivable that his goal is to maintain long-term Israeli armed presence and military freedom of action in Lebanon, even at the cost of preventing the rise of a sovereign state. But such an outcome will enable conditions in which non-state actors can continue to thrive.

Indeed, this question can be asked of Netanyahu’s policy in the region in general: does Israel want to only defeat or degrade adversaries around the region and notch up military victories in repeated battles, or does it want to use its power to bring about a stable, state-based, and prosperous Middle East in which it can thrive?

The US, Lebanon, and Israel all have an interest in implementing the first phase of the cessation of hostilities agreement, replacing Hizballah with the LAF and UNIFIL in the area south of the Litani, stabilizing the Lebanese-Israeli border, and enabling civilians from both sides to return to their border towns and villages. But the full implementation of the deal includes implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and other agreements, and hence the full disarmament of Hizballah

The Lebanese state needs a proactive strategy for disarming Hizballah

After hoping for an amicable resolution with Hizballah of its arms issue — a pathway that Hizballah has now cut off — the state needs a serious and proactive strategy to achieve its monopoly on the use of force. The recent 12-day Israeli-American campaign against Iran did not dramatically shift the situation in Lebanon, where Hizballah's refusal to disarm has only hardened. Despite suffering severe losses in 2024 and losing the strategic support of Syria with the fall of Assad, Hizballah remains a key node in Iran’s regional “forward defense” strategy. While Lebanese Hizballah leaders hold tactical autonomy, ultimate decisions about disarmament lie with Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran continues to see Hizballah as a useful tool — for keeping Israeli forces pinned down, obstructing US influence in Lebanon, and destabilizing the new Syrian order. Therefore, voluntary disarmament by Hizballah appears unlikely under current conditions.

From Hizballah’s domestic perspective, the situation is complex. While the movement retains symbolic capital from its past confrontations with Israel, the latest war exposed its military vulnerability, devastated its Shi’a support base, and cut off supply lines through Syria. Despite these setbacks and the need for reconstruction aid — which is contingent on Hizballah’s disarmament — the group fears that giving up arms would unravel its founding narrative of resistance and undermine its legitimacy. Moreover, Hizballah’s leaders may not even have the authority to make that decision, given Iran’s overarching control.

For the Lebanese state, the events of 2024–25 represent the first real opportunity in decades to rebuild sovereignty. A new, more independent government has made gains in asserting control over national territory and institutions. Initially, the government hoped that Hizballah’s leaders would, for pragmatic reasons, agree to disarm. But this expectation has proven unrealistic. The state must now adopt a more assertive strategy, setting a firm timetable for disarmament, stepping up actions against illegal arms and finance networks, building the LAF’s capacity, and communicating to Hizballah’s constituency that continued armament is blocking aid and reconstruction.

Realistically, the state has to avoid a rushed and full-on confrontation that could trigger civil strife or institutional collapse. Instead, it should implement a phased plan that includes proactive security measures right away, strategic messaging, and a credible roadmap toward full sovereignty within a set time limit. International diplomacy is relevant: Israel must implement the cessation of hostilities agreement to avoid undermining the state’s case for security provision. Linking Israeli withdrawal to Hizballah disarmament — as proposed by US envoy Tom Barrack — may offer a realistic path toward a sovereign and secure Lebanon. The time for waiting has passed; the state must now act with clarity and resolve.

Syria: A collapsed regime and a contested transition

Israeli policy in Syria is equally complex and often contradictory. While Netanyahu claims at least indirect credit for the fall of the Assad regime, he is very wary of the radical Islamist group that has taken over. Israel had coexisted uneasily with the Assad government for decades, but within days of the regime’s fall Netanyahu ordered the destruction of most of the Syrian armed forces and launched a ground incursion. In recent days and weeks, he has used protection of the Druze of southern Syria as a reason to bomb the Syrian Ministry of Defense and targets very close to the presidential palace in Damascus.

Despite many reservations and concerns, the US and most regional partners have thrown their weight behind the new Syrian leader, figuring he represents the best chance for the war-torn country to move forward. But Israel seems to be moving in a different direction by trying to ensure that the transition, at least under Sharaa, does not succeed and that Syria remains a failed and divided territory. Again, the question is whether Netanyahu seeks to leverage his “win” of bringing down the Assad regime and chasing Iran out of Syria by encouraging the emergence of a stable, unified state on Israel’s norther border — and Damascus has already made amply clear its desire to establish non-aggressive arrangements with its southern neighbor and eventually explore peace — or whether his primary goal is to maintain unrestrained, long-term military presence and freedom of action in the country even if that results in continued instability and conflict.

Indeed, the stakes in Syria are very high. If Sharaa sticks to the path the Arab Gulf countries, Turkey, Europe, and the US are urging him to take — and of which he publicly speaks, even if his radical followers frequently lurch in the opposite direction — then Syria could emerge as the linchpin of an increasingly integrated and stable Middle East. However, if the Syrian transition fails, the country could spiral into a fate even worse than that promised by a continued Assad regime. This could include an out-of-control sectarian and inter-ethnic war in Syria, with a more radical Islamist leader and faction in power in Damascus, and conflict engulfing minorities and other communities not only in Syria but in Lebanon as well. While Iran has an interest in the transition failing and regaining a foothold in Syria, Israel should not have the same perspective. The Shara-led government is years away from where it needs to be and should be held accountable for attacks and in some cases massacres of civilians under its watch, but Netanyahu’s investment in the breakup of Syria and the failure of a transition is the wrong policy.

Netanyahu’s strategic success and political failure

Netanyahu’s military victories are indisputable and have significantly shifted power balances across the Middle East. But he has not used his newfound sway to chart out a sustainable political future for Israel or for the region. For Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, what he proposes and has presided over is more open-ended conflict, occupation, and displacement with no scenario for sustainable political coexistence and governance. On Iran, there is really no “deal” that he is after, because — as the Iranians say about the Americans — he does not trust their word or their signature on a deal, so the path ahead is open-ended military conflict in pursuit of some chimera of regime change. Regarding Lebanon and Syria, Netanyahu’s actions have enabled a resurgence of hope for rebuilding sovereignty, but other policies he pursues are making it much harder for that statehood to be regained.

The deal within reach, but not grasped

Vis-à-vis the Arabs, the real “deal of the century” — a US-Saudi-Israeli agreement that would include Saudi-Israeli normalization alongside genuine concessions to the Palestinians — is more than ever a low-hanging fruit. It would not only further cement ties between Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, but with significant concessions to the Palestinians, it would allow other countries in the region and the Muslim world to follow suit. Moreover, it would remove the Palestine issue as a major leverage point for the Iranians and extremist Sunni groups. And it would dramatically increase not only regional security and prosperity, but that of Israelis — to say nothing of Palestinians — as well. Nonetheless, Netanyahu still appears unwilling or unable to take that historic win.

The US challenge

The events since Oct. 7 have significantly altered conditions in the Middle East and, in the process, created both new difficulties as well as new opportunities for US policymakers. President Trump has repeatedly made clear his preference for pursuing those fresh openings to end wars, strike lasting agreements, and bring about a more peaceful, integrated, and prosperous Middle East. Turkey and key Arab countries are also on the same page. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, seems wedded to long-term confrontation (even if it is receptive to a measure of de-escalation) and to maintaining its militia allies in the region (even if weakened). Israel has much to gain from the peaceful, integrated, and prosperous Middle East that might be achievable; but Netanyahu is not currently working toward those conditions. The US has a chance, however fleeting, to try to mold events in a more positive direction.

When he wants to, Trump is still able to step in as the most influential player in the Middle East; and he gained additional leverage after using military power against Iran. He and his team should focus their efforts in the months ahead on using this leverage to move away from open-ended war and toward lasting solutions for Gaza and the Palestine question; come up with a deal to manage the Iran nuclear challenge; achieve Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia that includes significant concessions and a positive future for Palestinians; and stabilize the Levant by supporting — not undermining — the rise of sovereign states in Lebanon and Syria. US leadership will help determine whether 2025 is viewed as a seminal inflection point that enabled the building of a more stable, secure, and prosperous regional order, or whether it was just the third year in another ongoing, multi-front armed conflict in the Middle East.

 

Paul Salem is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI). He previously served as MEI’s president and CEO and as vice president for international engagement. His research focuses on political change, democracy and governance, social and economic policy, as well as regional and international relations in the Middle East.

Photo by Mohammed Huwais/AFP via Getty Images